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Abstract The IEEE 802.15.4 standard has attracted timecritical applications in wireless sensor networks because of
its beacon-enabled mode and guaranteed timeslots (GTSs).
However, the GTS management scheme’s security mechanisms still leave the 802.15.4 medium access control
vulnerable to attacks. Further, the existing techniques in the
literature for securing 802.15.4 networks either focus on
nonbeacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks or cannot defend
against insider attacks for beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks. In this paper, we illustrate this by demonstrating
attacks on the availability and integrity of the beaconenabled 802.15.4 network. To confirm the validity of the
attacks, we implement the attacks using Tmote Sky motes
for wireless sensor nodes, where the malicious node is
deployed as an inside attacker. We show that the malicious
node can freely exploit information retrieved from the
beacon frames to compromise the integrity and availability
of the network. To defend against these attacks, we present
BCN-Sec, a protocol that ensures the integrity of data and
control frames in beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks. We
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implement BCN-Sec, and show its efficacy during various
attacks.
Keywords Beacon-enabled 802.15.4  Insider attacks 
Media access control  MAC misbehavior  Time-critical
applications  Wireless sensor networks

1 Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have emerged quickly
and attracted a number of diverse applications. The use of
these applications ranges from residential to government.
For example, Lorincz et al. [25] have introduced an
application (CodeBlue) and its infrastructure for a disaster
situation or a medical emergency. Within the CodeBlue
infrastructure, an emergency code from sensed data is used
to alert responsible people for an immediate response. The
military is also using WSNs to detect an adversary’s
behavior and location. For example, seismic sensors can be
used to detect the movement of heavy artillery (e.g., tanks)
in the battlefield. In either case, not receiving information
about the environment in a time-sensitive manner can have
significant consequences.
To provide support for time-sensitive communication,
the 802.15.4 standard provides a beacon-enabled mode.
Unlike nonbeacon-enabled mode, the beacon-enabled
mode in an 802.15.4 network employs a few end device
nodes and a centralized node [i.e., personal area network
coordinator (PC)] that broadcasts beacons to synchronize
the nodes in the network, manages guaranteed timeslots
(GTS) (de)allocation requests from the nodes, and assigns
dedicated slots for transmissions of the nodes through
beacons. The beacon broadcast and GTS management
scheme are the most critical parts of real-time delivery of
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time-sensitive data during the contention free period (CFP)
[5, 21, 22, 27, 28, 31].
However, many researchers have focused on improving
the performance or energy efficiency of beacon-enabled
802.15.4 MAC and the use of its GTS scheme. For
example, the IPP-HURRY research group has analyzed the
delay bound of GTS allocations to maximize the throughput of each GTS allocation for real-time sensor networks
[21, 22]. In addition, in [5] the authors present a case study
of Siemens Industry Automation Division that requires
real-time delivery of short alarms/messages. The case study
evaluates GTS allocation to maximize low latency of its
scheme. In many recent works on WSNs, reliable and realtime delivery are still primary problems to be solved. For
example, Anisi et al. [3] present how nodes can deliver data
to a base station with minimal packet loss. Shen et al. [35]
point out the dynamics of industrial applications and the
need for their real-time response. They present the implementation of a source-aware scheduling algorithm to
achieve a minimum delay for the response.
Although there has been a significant emphasis on
improving the performance of beacon-enabled 802.15.4
networks, there has been little work on securing them. This
is significant, given that the GTS management scheme of
the PC does not verify the identification (ID) of each node
that requests GTSs. Further the nodes in the network do not
validate the PC that broadcasts beacons. Therefore, an
inside attacker can easily compromise the guaranteed data
transmissions from the time-sensitive applications in the
beacon-enabled 802.15.4 network by either impersonating
a legitimate node (LN) (existing in the PAN or not) or the
PC (e.g., implement a Sybil attack [9] at the MAC layer).
This MAC misbehavior is a critical security problem not
only in the 802.15.4 network itself but also in new
emerging wireless technologies [e.g., wireless body area
networks (WBANs)] that consider the use of the 802.15.4
network [13].
In this paper, we demonstrate six attacks that are possible by an inside attacker in a beacon-enabled 802.15.4
network. The inside attacker targets the vulnerabilities of
the beacon broadcast and the GTS management scheme.
The contributions of this paper include the discovery of
vulnerable properties of the beacon-enabled mode in the
802.15.4 standard and the implementation and analysis of
six potential insider attacks against the vulnerabilities. We
also design and implement a lightweight security protocol
for beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks (BCN-Sec) and
illustrate its costs and how it defends against these attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We review
related works, including security protocols for WSNs and
attacks on beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks, in Sect. 2. In
Sect. 3, we briefly illustrate the beacon broadcast and the
GTS management scheme and explain their vulnerabilities.
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In Sect. 4, we present the experiment design and show the
hardware and software components. In Sect. 5, we first
define an attack model and present an overview of the six
attacks against the vulnerabilities. In Sect. 6, we describe
the implementation of the attacks. We present BCN-Sec,
which is used to defend against these attacks in Sect. 7. In
Sect. 8, we show the experiment results in the execution of
each attack and their defense with BCN-Sec. We conclude
our work in Sect. 9.

2 Related work
In this section, we categorize current 802.15.4 defense
mechanisms into nonbeacon-enabled mode and beaconenabled mode according to the literature and highlight their
limitations. We also discuss the difference between our
attacks on beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks and others
previously demonstrated.
2.1 Defense mechanisms in beacon-less mode
The received signal strength indication (RSSI) has been
proposed to identify nodes conducting a Sybil attack [7, 42].
The basic idea of RSSI-based methods is that sensor nodes at
different locations can be differentiated by the different
RSSIs. Demirbas et al. [7] calculate the ratio of RSSIs to
improve the previous RSSI-based solutions. Yang et al. [42]
propose a K-means cluster analysis that can be applied to
RSSI readings. However, RSSI-based solutions can be evaded by malicious nodes (MNs) with mobility.
Another approach to securing beacon-less 802.15.4
networks focuses on the use of cryptography. Zhang et al.
[43] propose lightweight identity certificates to distinguish
between LNs and MNs using multiple stolen or forged IDs,
while the authors of [10–12, 24] focus on key distribution
and management algorithms to provide this protection.
However, it is not practical for resource constrained sensor
devices to use highly expensive key distribution methods.
Link layer security protocols constitute another category
of defense mechanisms for beacon-less 802.15.4 networks.
SPINS, TinySec, and MiniSec [19, 26, 32] fall in this
category and are designed specifically for energy constrained sensor nodes and provide data authentication and
confidentiality in the link layer. However, these protocols
are susceptible to failures when an MN in the network (e.g.,
a compromised node or a malicious insider) acquires a
shared pair-wise key or a network-wide secret key.
Moreover, even if their shortcomings are excluded, none
of the aforementioned schemes can be directly applied to
beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks. This is because in
addition to the data authentication provided by the aforementioned schemes, beacon and command messages must
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also be secured. Perrig et al. [32] also state that traditional
data authentication techniques cannot be used to provide
broadcast beacon authentication.
2.2 Defense mechanisms in beacon-enabled mode
Few defense methods have been proposed for beaconenabled mode. Amini et al. [2] propose an RSSI solution
where they introduced the use of a disc number and a
device ID. However, if an MN is close enough to an LN in
the same PAN (i.e., an inside attacker), its RSSI will likely
be similar to the RSSI of the LN.
The 802.15.4 standard [16] also has security mechanisms to provide data confidentiality and data authenticity.
However, Sastry et al. [34] point out that these security
mechanisms have vulnerabilities related to the initialization
vector (IV) management, key management, and integrity
protection. Moreover, the security mechanism only guarantees data authentication, not authentication for beacon
broadcasts. Alim et al. [1] introduce EAP-Sens, which
provides entity authentication and key management to
validate each device ID with the extensible authentication
protocol (EAP) [4] using EAP-generalized pre-shared keys
(EAP-GPSKs) [6]. However, EAP-Sens has the same
problems as the 802.15.4 standard because it is based on
the security mechanisms of the 802.15.4 standard.
Overall, neither the aforementioned detection mechanisms nor secure link layer protocols for the beaconenabled mode are effective in the case of inside attackers.
Therefore, we present BCN-Sec, which has less overhead
for data authentication than the security mechanisms in the
802.15.4 standard and provides authentication for beacon
broadcasts.
2.3 Attacks on beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks
Sokullu et al. [37] demonstrate GTS attacks on the
802.15.4, particularly in beacon-enabled mode, but they
use ns-2 simulations. The GTS attacks in [37] were divided
into four different scenarios: One Intelligent Attacker
(OIA), One Random Attacker (ORA), Two Intelligent
Attackers (TIAs), and Two Random Attackers (TRAs).
Their GTS attacks cause collisions to GTSs during the CFP
and target either the maximum number of GTSs to an LN
or one randomly chosen GTS [37]. In contrast, the six
attacks that we present seek to exploit GTSs legitimately
(i.e., without causing MAC layer collisions), by sending
GTS (de)allocation or broadcasting beacons at a synchronized timeslot during a contention access period (CAP) to
illustrate the general vulnerabilities of the protocol.
In addition to presenting different types of attacks
compared to those discussed in [37], we implemented our
attacks on real devices (i.e., Tmote Sky motes) rather than
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in simulation. This latter point is extremely important for
802.15.4 MAC layer attacks because in addition to the
challenge of accurately modeling physical layer interference, simulations do not account for constraints imposed
by the hardware, operating system, and applications, which
can lead to simplified attack scenarios.
This is especially pronounced in resource-constrained
devices (e.g., Tmote Sky motes). For example, to implement the Sybil attack (at the MAC layer) in TinyOS, we
modified the timer function of TinyOS (in TimerC.nc) to
make it multithreaded so each fake node could use an
instance. Each instance now has to compete internally
(within TinyOS) to gain access to the node’s resources
(e.g., processor, transceiver), making this attack much
more difficult to conduct. This small, but noticeable nuance
is not present in simulation tools.
We previously introduced four attacks on the beaconenabled 802.15.4 network [17]. This work extends the
previous work in [17] with two new implemented attacks
as well as the presentation of BCN-Sec to defend against
the attacks.

3 Problem statement
In this section, we briefly explain the concept of beacon
broadcasts and the GTS management scheme of the
802.15.4 standard. Additionally, we state the vulnerabilities of these schemes.
3.1 Beacon broadcasts
The 802.15.4 standard [16] defines the superframe (SF) that
consists of a CAP, a CFP, and an inactive period for
802.15.4 beacon-enabled mode as shown in Fig. 1. The
active period of the CAP and the CFP is divided into 16
timeslots. The timeslots can be synchronized through
beacons that the PC periodically broadcasts at intervals
defined by the macBeaconOrder value.
Upon receiving the beacons, the nodes take the beacon
order (BO) and SF order (SO) from the SF specification
field in Fig. 2(b) and re-calculates the timeslot interval, SF
duration (SD), and beacon interval (BI) for synchronization
to the SF of the PAN in Fig. 1.
3.2 Vulnerability of beacon broadcasts
3.2.1 Verification of the PC
The LNs in the PAN rely on the two important values, BO
and SO to change their internal timers used for synchronization and transmitting messages. However, when processing the received beacons, the LNs do not authenticate
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Fig. 1 The superframe structure
of beacon-enabled 802.15.4

Fig. 2 The beacon frame
structure of the beacon-enabled
802.15.4 with the detail fields
description of superframe
specification (b) and GTS field
(c)

(a)

(b)

(c)

Fig. 3 An MN impersonating the PC and broadcasting false BO and SO with the same PAN ID and the PC’s ID

the beacons and cannot tell whether they really come from
the PC.
The LNs only confirm that the PAN ID in the packet is
the same as the value used during bootstrapping of the
network. Thus, if an MN broadcasts malicious beacons
with the same PAN ID as that of the PC, the LNs process
the beacons as shown in Fig. 3. As mentioned in Sect. 2,
the data authentication of the standard does not apply to
beacon broadcasts.
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3.3 GTS management scheme
The PC in the PAN manages the GTSs during the CFP by
adding the GTS field in the beacon frames as responses to
the GTS (de)allocation requests as shown in Fig. 2. As
shown in Fig. 1, the PC defines that each SF has a maximum of seven GTSs for the CFP other than
aMinCAPLength in [16]. The PC assigns the LNs issuing
GTS allocation requests at the specified GTSs. Then, the
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PC releases the assigned slots only after receiving a GTS
deallocation request from the same LNs. We briefly explain
the normal GTS allocation and deallocation processes
below.
3.3.1 GTS allocation
If an LN has data to transmit, it generates a GTS allocation
request. The PC will allocate an available GTS to the LN,
and all subsequent beacon frames will contain the GTS
field defining the device address, GTS slot and direction.
Upon receiving the beacon, the LN will schedule the
pending packet to be transmitted at the allocated GTS. The
GTS allocation process is shown in Fig. 4(a).
3.3.2 GTS deallocation
The GTS deallocation occurs in general when an LN using a
specified GTS sends an explicit GTS deallocation request to
the PC. The GTS deallocation process is shown in Fig. 4(b).
3.4 Vulnerabilities of GTS management scheme
The PC manages a list of GTSs to control the network
access during the CFP. However, the GTS management
scheme has the following vulnerabilities.
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3.4.1 GTS expiration
According to the 802.15.4 standard, the PC can initiate
GTS deallocation when it observes no data transmission
from the LNs at the assigned GTSs. The PC deallocates
unused GTSs within every 2  n SFs, where n is defined as
either 2ð8macBeaconOrderÞ ð0  macBeaconOrder  8Þ or 1
(9  macBeaconOrder  14). However, an MN can keep
its assigned GTSs continuously by simply sending another
GTS allocation request or transmitting data at the GTSs.
This renders the GTS expiration ineffective.
3.4.2 Verification of sensor nodes’ IDs
In the 802.15.4 GTS management scheme, the PC manages
the IDs of LNs requesting GTS (de)allocations (i.e., the PC
assigns or discards the GTSs by the LNs’ IDs). By looking
at the IDs, the PC also avoids duplicated GTS (de)allocation requests from the same LNs. However, the PC cannot
avoid, for example, a GTS allocation (from an LN) and a
deallocation requests (from an MN), where the MN
impersonates the LN’s ID as shown in Fig. 5. This is
because the PC does not authenticate the LNs appropriately. Thus, the MN can easily subvert the verification
process for the LNs by using new forged IDs or impersonating LNs in the network.

Fig. 4 GTS allocation and
deallocation procedure
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Fig. 5 An MN impersonating LNs A and B IDs

4 Experiment design
In this section, we present the network design and hardware
and software components used for the experiments and
implementation.

For the attack implementation, we used Open-ZB [30],
an 802.15.4 open source software that supports a beaconenabled mode. In particular, we used the open source of the
ZigBee version in conjunction with TinyOS v2.x [41].
Figure 6 shows the Tmote Sky motes and CC2420 EB/EM.

4.1 Network design
5 Overview of attacks
In this paper, we deploy wireless sensor nodes supporting
the 802.15.4 standard and its beacon-enabled mode. Normally, beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks consist of few
groups of clusters. One cluster can be composed of one PC
and a few nodes. For the experiments, we arrange a small
cluster that consists of one PC and three LNs including an
MN.
The PC broadcasts beacons and receives sensed data
from the LNs. The LNs sense the temperature and humidity
around the experiment area and transmit the data to the PC
during the CAP or the CFP. The LNs do not communicate
with one another, but only with the PC (e.g., a unicast
message transmission). Only four nodes were used because
the open source implementation used became unstable with
more than four nodes in the network. However, it is
important to note that these attacks are independent of the
number of nodes deployed in the network.

In this section, we introduce the attack model and illustrate
the overview of the attacks based on the model. We present
a total of six attacks and categorize them according to the
characteristics of the attacks.
5.1 Attack model
Similar to the threat models defined in [20] and [33], we
assume that an MN is a mote-class, inside, and active

4.2 Hardware and software components
We used four Tmote Sky motes [29] based on the TelosB
platform: one for the PC, two for LNs, and one for the MN.
In addition, we used the Texas Instruments (TI) CC2420
Evaluation Board/Evaluation Module (EB/EM) [40] in
conjunction with the TI Chipcon packet sniffer [39] to
capture and analyze packet traffic in the network.
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attacker. We also assume that the network uses the default
configuration, that is there is no authentication present
between the LNs and the PC and is operated in the beaconenabled mode of the 802.15.4 standard [16]. The MN can
eavesdrop the communication between the PC and the LNs
within the same range of the beacon-enabled 802.15.4
network. Moreover, due to no authentication, the MN can
easily impersonate both the PC and the LNs.
By eavesdropping and impersonation, the MN aims to
achieve a few types of denial of service (DoS) attacks. In
particular, the MN targets the beacon and CFP through the
DoS attacks that are very critical for timeslot synchronization in the beacon-enabled network. For example, if the
CodeBlue infrastructure [25] does not prevent the MN from
impersonating the PC and the LNs, a DoS attack can prevent legitimate recipients from receiving time-sensitive
alerts and medical information.
Given these assumptions, we deploy one Tmote Sky
mote as the MN that has the same capabilities as the LNs.
The MN is located near the LNs in the beacon-enabled
802.15.4 network. The MN listens to beacons from the PC
to get synchronization information of the network and GTS
(de)allocation requests from the LNs in the passive phase.
In the active phase, the MN exploits vulnerabilities of the
beacon broadcasts and the GTS management scheme by
impersonating either the PC or the LNs.
Table 1 presents the summary of the attacks and the
exploitation of the vulnerabilities in the beacon-enabled
802.15.4 network.
5.2 Impersonating existing identities in the PAN
In this category, we describe four attacks. The first attack
presented is the synchronization attack. In this attack, the
LNs are lead to synchronize their SF timeslots with the
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manipulated beacons from the MN. The next two attacks
block data transmission from the LNs in the PAN that want
to gain GTSs and transmit time-sensitive data in the slots.
The fourth attack injects false sensed data into the traffic
stream from an LN to the PC during the CFP.
5.2.1 Synchronization attack
This attack influences all the LNs in the network concurrently, whereas the other attacks in this category can affect
only one or a few LNs. The MN first impersonates the PC’s
ID and uses the same PAN ID as that of the PC. The MN
manipulates two important parameters: BO and SO as
shown in Fig. 1. To compete with the beacons from the PC,
the MN adjusts the BO and SO to have more SFs within
one SF of the PC.
Figure 7 shows two different SF sequences. Figure
7(a) has the SFs configured with BO and SO (6 and 4) from
the legitimate PC whereas Fig. 7 has the SFs with BO and
SO (4 and 2) from the MN. Thus, the MN can compete
with the PC by having four more SFs in one SF from the
PC. This causes the LNs to constantly synchronize their
SFs with the manipulated BO and SO (4 and 2) arriving
immediately after those from the PC although they process
the beacons from both the PC and the MN.
5.2.2 DoS of data transmission
Impersonating LNs: If an MN is in the transmission range
of the PC, it can easily obtain the IDs of active LNs in the
PAN. The MN also knows whether or not an LN tries to
transmit its sensed data during the CFP by looking at the
GTS allocation requests or the beacons. In this attack, the
MN impersonates the active LNs in the PAN and sends
GTS deallocation requests using the LNs’ IDs to the PC.

Table 1 Attacks and the
characteristics
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5.2.3 False data injection
(a)

(b)
Fig. 7 The two different SF sequences, (a) and (b), from the PC and
the MN respectively: (a) with BO:SO = 6:4 from the PC and (b) with
BO:SO = 4:2 from the MN

Figure 8(a) shows an example of this attack. While two
LNs request GTS allocation to transmit data in the next
SF’s CFP, the MN can terminate the data transmissions of
the LNs by sending a GTS deallocation request with the
LNs’ IDs. Since the PC receives the GTS deallocation
request while processing the GTS allocation from the LNs,
it ignores the GTS allocation coming first and does not
assign any GTS to the LNs. As a result, the LNs that do not
have any assigned GTS cannot transmit its sensed data.
Impersonating the PC: The previous attack impersonates the LNs’ IDs to cause the PC to deallocate the GTSs.
In this attack, the MN impersonates the PC and broadcasts
manipulated beacons with no GTS descriptor. When the
LNs request GTS allocation to transmit its sensed data, the
LNs wait for beacons coming with the GTS descriptors that
tell them the assigned GTS information [e.g., address, slot,
and length as shown in Fig. 2(c)].
If the beacons that the LNs receive do not have any GTS
descriptor, the LNs assume that they cannot transmit the
sensed data to the PC due to no GTS being allocated. Thus,
the MN impersonating the PC keeps sending a manipulated
beacon without GTS descriptors while the PC broadcasts a
beacon with GTS descriptors. Since the LNs just process
the last beacon, if there are more beacons received within
the proper boundary of the timeslot, it receives the
manipulated beacons from the MN and believes that no
GTS is assigned to it by the PC. Thus, it does not transmit
data to the PC as shown in Fig. 8(b).

In this attack, the MN identifies that an LN has not
requested GTS allocation by looking at the GTS descriptors in the beacons. Then, the MN chooses the LN’s ID that
does not have any GTS allocation requests and sends a
GTS allocation request using that ID. After it confirms that
a GTS is allocated by the PC, the MN sends false data with
the ID to the PC during the CFP while the LN sends its
sensed data during the CAP. The PC regards the false data
as time-sensitive data from the LN due to it being sent with
the same LN’s ID during the CFP. The false data sent by
the MN is passed to the application.
Figure 9 shows how this attack works; for instance,
when an LN is transmitting current temperature data during
the CAP, the MN sends a GTS allocation request with the
spoofed ID, pretends to be another LN, and can inject false
temperature data during the CFP.
5.3 Impersonating non-existing identities in the PAN
In this category, an MN forges up to 7 different IDs
depending on the maximum number of available GTSs.
The two attacks presented in this section occupy all 7
GTSs, which result in no GTS being available for the LNs.
5.3.1 DoS of GTS requests
The goal of this attack is not for the MN to use the
bandwidth requested, rather it is to prevent the LNs from
transmitting data during the CFP. To perform this attack,
an MN continuously monitors the available GTS slots with
the intent of completely occupying them. Then, the MN
sends several GTS allocation requests to fill up all the
available GTSs in the SF. The advantage of this attack is
that the MN can reduce its energy consumption, because
once it occupies all 7 GTSs, it does not need to send out
further any GTS allocation requests.

(a)

(b)
Fig. 8 An MN blocking an LN sending data during the CFP
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If the PC performs the GTS expiration, the MN starts
sending GTS allocation requests until it occupies all 7
GTSs. The MN repeats the aforementioned steps to ensure
that the LNs do not have access to available GTSs. Figure
10 shows how the MN takes two GTSs of the LNs (while
currently occupying  five GTS allocation requests) as
follows: (1) the MN monitors ` and ´ GTS deallocation
requests from the LNs A and B. (2) Then, the MN completely fills all 7 GTSs with ˆ two additional GTS allocation requests.
5.3.2 Stealing network bandwidth
Similar to the DoS of GTS requests, the MN observes the
GTS list in order to eventually occupy the available GTSs.
However, in this attack, the MN transmits data at the
assigned timeslots. The purpose of data transmission is to
prevent the PC from dropping the assigned GTSs.
As shown in Fig. 11, the second CFP has data transmitted from both LNs and an MN. However, since the LNs
send GTS deallocation requests during the third CAP, the
MN sends a GTS allocation request to occupy the new free
GTS. Eventually, only the MN sends data during the fourth
CFP. The timeslots will never be vacant during the CFP of
every SF.

6 Implementation of attacks
In this section, we introduce the application layer and
MAC layer modules that were implemented to execute the
six attacks described in the previous section. We explain in
detail how the MN runs the attacks in the PAN.
6.1 Attack modules for implementation
We have implemented our attacks based on the existing
modules provided by Open-ZB. Given the modules in the
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Fig. 11 An MN stealing network bandwidth in all 7 GTSs during
CFP

MAC layer of 802.15.4, we mainly modified the source
code of the MAC layer for our attacks and added a malicious application (MAC misbehavior app) as shown in Fig.
12. The modified MAC layer and the malicious application
target the vulnerabilities of the GTS management scheme
described in Sect. 3.
We have two options for implementing the MAC misbehavior attacks: the first option is to implement a module
in the application layer, while the second option relies on
the implementation of modules in the application and MAC
layers. We present the discussion of the most efficient
approach, implementation in the MAC layer, and point the
reader to the technical report [18] for the discussion on the
application layer implementation.
In the MAC layer, we implement the MAC misbehavior
attacks by adding Mal-PD_DATA management as shown in
Fig. 13. Mal-PD_DATA management intercepts a function,
PD_DATA.indication(), which indicates all packets (e.g.,
beacon, command (GTS request), data) of the communication in the PAN. Then, it directly executes the attacks in
the MAC layer. For instance, if the packet is a beacon from
the PC, Mal-PD_DATA management looks at available
GTSs and directly calls Mal-GTS management to fill all
remaining GTSs. If the packet is a GTS allocation request
from an LN, Mal-PD_DATA management informs MalGTS management of the LN’s ID. Then, Mal-GTS management sends a GTS deallocation request with the ID.
This allows our attacks to be more efficiently executed with

Fig. 10 An MN filling up all 7
GTSs
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Fig. 12 The software and
hardware modules of the Tmote
Sky mote. The software
modules consist of the general
modules of TinyOS 2.x and the
protocol stack of Open-ZB. The
region with the gray
perpendicular lines represents
the modified modules for the
MN

Fig. 13 The attacks improved
in the MAC layer with the MalPD_DATA management module

lower communication overhead. The reader is pointed to
the technical report for the detailed algorithms for implementing each attack.

7 Securing beacon-enabled 802.15.4
In this section, we propose an applied security protocol
BCN-Sec dedicated to the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 network under the assumptions in Sect. 5.1 and present an
overview and the implementation of BCN-Sec.
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BCN-Sec aims to provide both unicast authentication
and broadcast authentication that can defend against the
aforementioned attacks. Table 2 shows that the attack/
countermeasure relationships for the attacks considered in
this paper. Unicast authentication can defend against the
following attacks: DoS of data transmission by impersonating LNs, False data injection, DoS of GTS requests, and
Stealing network bandwidth. In addition, broadcast
authentication can defend against the following attacks:
Synchronization attack and DoS of data transmission by
impersonating the PC.
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Table 2 Security requirements of BCN-Sec
Attacks

Security requirements
Unicast
authentication

Broadcast
authentication

N

Y

Y
N

N
Y

False data injection

Y

N

DoS of GTS requests

Y

N

Stealing network bandwidth

Y

N

Synchronization attack
DoS of data transmission
Impersonating LNs
Impersonating the PC

We have implemented BCN-Sec which is based on a
cipher block chaining message authentication code (CBCMAC) (message integrity code is substituted for MAC
henceforward to avoid confusion with MAC) 128-bit with
the advanced encryption standard (AES) (CBC-MIC
henceforward) and one-way key chains. The CBC-MIC is
sufficient for message authentication since it can process
arbitrary length messages due to the block chaining method
and has reasonable performance for authentication with
AES (due to a minimum number of cipher function calls
[14]).
Like the 802.15.4 standard [16], BCN-Sec uses the
CBC-MIC for the PC to authenticate data and control
messages from the LNs. This enables BCN-Sec to prevent
an MN from transmitting forged data messages (e.g., false
data injection). BCN-Sec can also defend against the
exploitation of forged GTS (de)allocation requests (e.g.,
DoS of data transmission by impersonating LNs, DoS of
GTS requests, and stealing network bandwidth).
Further, in BCN-Sec, broadcast authentication using
one-way key chains is used for the LNs to authenticate
beacons from the PC whereas the 802.15.4 standard relies
on a network-wise shared key. This enables BCN-Sec to
prevent an MN from broadcasting forged beacons (e.g.,
synchronization attack and DoS of data transmission by
impersonating the PC).
Figure 14 illustrates the comparison between the frames
without security ‘‘No security’’ and the frames for BCNSec’s unicast and broadcast authentication.
The following sub-sections explain BCN-Sec’s unicast
and broadcast authentication operations and implementation in detail.

messages (GTS requests). To prevent these attacks, unicast
command and data frames are authenticated with a MIC
using a keyed cryptographic hash function by the PC.
7.1.1 Implementation
We use a hardware (HW) CBC-MIC provided by the
CC2420 chip on the Tmote Sky mote (HW-MIC) [38]. The
HW-MIC is one of CC2420’s MIC security operations. It
uses a 128-bit key that can be set on demand and generates
a 128-bit MIC for the LNs from any size unicast messages.
Compared to the ‘‘No security’’ unicast message in Fig.
14(b) and (c), BCN-Sec adds a 4-byte security header (SH)
as shown in Fig. 15 and a 16-byte MIC for unicast
authentication in Fig. 14(b0 ) and (c0 ). Each field in the SH is
used to configure the HW-MIC except the key counter
(KCT) field. The 2 bytes of KCT increase the length of the
sequence number (SN) to a total of 3 bytes. BCN-Sec also
uses an internal 4-byte secret counter (SCT) for each LN as
a nonce that is included in the MIC.
7.1.2 Authentication procedure
The following illustrates how BCN-Sec applies the HWMIC to unicast messages with a control message (a command frame):
7.1.3 Key setup
In BCN-Sec, each LN has pre-shared keys and SCTs with
the PC (KLNi and SCTLNi respectively, where i is
{1; 2; . . .; n}, the index of each LN in the PAN) before the
LNs are deployed.
7.1.4 Transmitting control messages
When LNi transmits a unicast control message [CMDLNi as
shown in Fig. 14(b)] to the PC, LNi first generates a MIC
(MICLNi ) for CMDLNi . MICLNi can guarantee freshness
since it includes the SN (1-byte) in the frame control field
as shown in Fig. 14, the KCT (2-bytes) as shown in Fig. 15,
and the SCT1 (4-bytes) pre-shared with the PC. The following shows a BCN-Sec unicast control message
BCNSECCMDLNi corresponding to Fig. 14(b0 )

7.1 Unicast message authentication
1

In several of our attacks, an MN is able to send GTS
(de)allocation requests with forged IDs. This is possible
because the PC does not sufficiently authenticate control

Including the SCT inside of the MIC as opposed to transmitting an
encrypted nonce in the frame can lead to synchronization problems if
packets are lost. However, since beacon-enabled 802.15.4 uses linklayer acknowledgments and retransmissions, the chance of losing
synchronization is minimal.
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(a)

(a’)

(b)

(b’)

(c)

(c’)
Fig. 14 The frames of the 802.15.4 MAC with ‘‘No security’’ in (a), (b), and (c) and BCN-Sec in (a0 ), (b0 ), and (c0 ). In (a0 ), Key Disclosure is a
disclosed key in one-way key chains. The shaded regions are authenticated fields

LNi ! PC
BCNSECCMDLNi

¼ LenjjMHRjjMSDUjjSHjj
MICLNi ðKLNi ; LenjMHRjMSDUjSHjSCTLNi Þ
jjMFR
where Len is the length of the frame and MHR, MSDU, and
MFR represent a MAC header (MHR), a MAC service data
unit (MSDU), and a MAC footer (MFR) for the CMDLNi .
BCN-Sec adds SH and MICLNi to MSDU for
BCNSECCMDLNi . MICLNi covers the SH SH and all the
fields of CMDLNi except MFR to be authenticated.
7.1.5 Verifying control messages
The PC takes Len, MHR, MSDU, and SH from
BCNSECCMDLNi and SCTLNi pre-shared. Then, it generates
a MIC from them with KLNi . If the MIC and MICLNi match,
the PC confirms that BCNSECCMDLNi came from LNi.
7.2 Broadcast authentication
While unicast authentication provides the PC with the trust
of command and data messages that are transmitted from
the LNs, broadcast authentication provides an efficient way
to ensure the authenticity of the PC’s beacon broadcasts.
Unlike unicast command and data messages sent by multiple LNs to a single PC, beacon messages are broadcast to
all the LNs in the PAN.
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Fig. 15 The security header (4-bytes) of BCN-Sec

During broadcasts, the LNs share the same key as the
PC in a similar fashion to unicast authentication. However,
if this key is not dynamic and is known to every LN, any
LN can masquerade as the PC. For this reason, BCN-Sec
uses one-way key chains [23] that use a one-way function
to generate a sequence of keys. Many techniques similar to
one-way key chains have been proposed for various cryptographic applications and particularly for broadcast
authentication [32, 44].
7.2.1 Implementation
For the one-way key chain, we have ported an MD5 implementation in C [8] to TinyOS. Then, we coupled its hash
function (one-way) with the HW-MIC. In BCN-Sec, the MD5
hash function is used to generate multiple sets of one-way key
chains for the PC2 (e.g., K1 ¼ fkð1;1Þ ; kð1;2Þ ; . . .; kð1;jÞ g, …,
Ki ¼ fkði;1Þ ; kði;2Þ ; . . .; kði;jÞ g, where K is a set of multiple key
2

We assume that the PC is more powerful and has storage
requirements for the key chain (e.g., shimmer [36]) since the PC is
required to store the entire key chains. The storage requirements for
the LNs is minimal (e.g., only one key for unicast authentication and
the last key(s) of one-way key chains).
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chains and k is a key in the key chain). Only the PC knows all
the keys in the key chains, and it pre-shares the last keys (e.g.,
kð1;jÞ ; kð2;jÞ ; . . .; kði;jÞ ) in the key chains with the LNs during
bootstrapping.
The LNs cannot get any previous key from the last keys
since the MD5 hash function is one-way. Thus, the PC
discloses the previous key (e.g., kði;j1Þ ) from the key
chains in the key disclosure (KD) field as shown in Fig.
14(a0 ) whenever it broadcasts beacons (i.e., one key per
broadcast). The PC also discloses two references for the
previous key kði;j1Þ : (1) the key ID (i) in the KeyID field
and (2) the key index (j  1) in the KCT field of the SH.
The key ID (i) refers to a set of the key chains, and the key
index (j  1) refers to an index in the key chain.
The LNs can then verify the key kði;j1Þ through the predisclosed key with the MD5 hash function. The key disclosure in BCN-Sec considers two special cases: (1) the
disclosed key is out-of-sync. (2) the PC desires to change
the key chain (possibly because it suspects that a key chain
has been compromised).
If an LN has missed one or more beacons and the key
index is out-of-sync, it can verify that the key (e.g., kði;j1Þ )
is at its ID (i) and index (j  1) in the key chains by using
the last key kði;jÞ . For instance, if the key index is 20 (out of
50 keys) on the first key chain (the key kð1;20Þ and the last
key kð1;50Þ ), BCN-Sec executes the MD5 hash function with
the key n times (ðFðkð1;20Þ Þn ¼ kð1;50Þ ) to get the last key,
where n is 50 (total keys) 20 (key index).
If the PC wants to change the key chain (e.g., from K1 to
K2 ), it turns on the reset flag (1-bit) in the Reserved field in the
SH in Fig. 15. Then, the PC discloses the next to last key in the
new key chain (kð2;j1Þ ) in the KD field (because the LNs are
loaded with several initial keys for various key chains predeployment). The obvious weakness with this approach is that
after all of the key chains have been exhausted, the LNs would
need to be provided a new set of keys offline. However, as we
plan to do in our future work, BCN-Sec3 can be implemented
such that new initial keys from new key chains can be disclosed in beacon frames. This will increase the size of the
beacon frame during this disclosure period, but will obviate
the need for getting new keys offline.
After the LNs obtain the disclosed key, the LNs need to
authenticate the PC’s beacon by using the HW-MIC and the key.
7.2.2 Authentication procedure
The following shows how BCN-Sec applies the HW-MIC
and the one-way key chain to broadcast messages (i.e., a
beacon message):
3

It is also important to note that the current implementation can be
extended to defend against a birthday attack as in [15].
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Key setup: The PC generates the key chains
(Ki ¼ fkði;0Þ ; kði;1Þ ; kði;2Þ ; . . .; kði;j1Þ ; kði;jÞ g) from kði;0Þ by
using MD5 hash function F. Thus, kði;jÞ ¼ F ð kði;j1Þ Þ, where
j is the maximum number of keys (new keying material
would be exchanged prior to j ¼ 1 to continue the secure
communications). Then, the last keys kði;jÞ are pre-shared
between the PC and the LNs before they are deployed.
Broadcast beacons: The PC sends the first message
using the next to last key in the key chain (Ki ). The pattern
continues and the PC traverses the chain backwards, using
the previous key in the chain for the next transmission. The
key expires after each transmission and the function that
generates the key is one-way so that even LNs cannot
masquerade as the PC.
When the PC broadcasts a beacon message [BCNði;j1Þ
as shown in Fig. 14(a)] to the LNs, the PC enables the HWMIC to add the KD kði;j1Þ and generates a MIC (MICði;j1Þ )
for BCNði;j1Þ .
The following shows a BCN-Sec beacon message
BCNSECBCNði;j1Þ :
PC ! LNs
BCNSECBCNði;j1Þ

¼ LenjjMHRjjMSDUjjSHjjkði;j1Þ jj
MICði;j1Þ ðkði;j1Þ ; LenjMHRjMSDUjSHjkði;j1Þ Þ
jjMFR
where ði; j  1Þ is a sequence of the key chains, i is
changed once the PC desires to change to a new key chain,
and j is decremented by 1 after each transmission while j[0.
BCN-Sec adds SH, kði;j1Þ , and MICði;j1Þ to MSDU for
BCNSECBCNði;j1Þ . MICði;j1Þ covers the SH SH, the KD
kði;j1Þ , and all the fields of the beacon BCNði;j1Þ to be
authenticated.
Verifying beacon: The LNs first take kði;j1Þ from
BCNSECBCNði;j1Þ and verify it with the MD5 hash
function F. kði;jÞ ¼ F ð kði;j1Þ Þ, where kði;jÞ is already verified in the previous beacon or trusted in the case of the
initial key disclosed pre-deployment. If kði;j1Þ is verified,
the LNs generate a MIC from the fields: Len, MHR,
MSDU, SH, and kði;j1Þ from BCNSECBCNði;j1Þ . If the
MIC and MICði;j1Þ match, the LNs confirm that
BCNSECBCNði;j1Þ came from the PC. That is, the LNs
receive the previous key in the chain and assume that it is
valid if its hash is the current key. Thus, using one-way key
chains enables the PC to efficiently provide authentication
to its beacon broadcasts.
7.3 BCN-Sec communication costs
In this section, we present the communication costs of
BCN-Sec. Figure 14(a–c) shows beacon, command, and
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data frames with ‘‘No security’’. Figure 14(a0 –c0 ) presents
the additional fields in the frames using BCN-Sec compared to ‘‘No security’’ and the length. In addition to the
SH (4-bytes), BCN-Sec adds the KD and MIC (16-bytes
each) to regular beacons for broadcast authentication and
the MIC (16-bytes) to regular command and data frames
for unicast authentication.
As a comparison to BCN-Sec, we estimated the security
mechanisms of the 802.15.4 standard and chose one of the
security mechanisms, MIC-128 [16], which is similar to the
HW-MIC. We use the label ‘‘Security’’ for MIC-128
henceforward. Enabling ‘‘Security’’ adds a 6-byte auxiliary
security header and a 16-byte MIC.
Table 3 shows a summary of the communication costs of
BCN-Sec with its viability during different attacks. In the
table, we present the packet sizes (MHR, MSDU, and MFR)
from our experiments (beacon fra-mes with all 7 GTS
descriptors, command frames with GTS allocation request,
and data frames with 2-byte data). The packet size in total
shows the increased overhead (communication cost) and
viability of ‘‘Security’’ and BCN-Sec from ‘‘No security.’’
In beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks, BCN-Sec can
prevent the synchronization attack and DoS of data transmission by impersonating the PC with 94.7 % overhead
whereas ‘‘Security’’ is not a viable solution due to the
network-wise shared key. Moreover, BCN-Sec adds 166 %
overhead to secure unicast control messages (ST’S
(de)allocation requests) whereas ‘‘Security’’ has 183 %
overhead (17 % more).

Table 3 The viability and
communication costs of BCNSec

Security overheada is the size of
security materials: ‘‘Security’’
with auxiliary security header
and MIC and BCN-Sec with SH,
MIC, and KD (only for beacon
frame)

123

Wireless Netw (2015) 21:1517–1535

For unicast data message authentication, BCN-Sec has
125 % overhead whereas ‘‘Security’’ provides the same
authentication as BCN-Sec with 137.5 % overhead (12.5 %
more). Thus, although BCN-Sec has the same level of
authentication as MIC-128 for unicast messages, it has less
communication overhead than ‘‘Security’’ of the standard. In
addition, BCN-Sec provides broadcast authentication.

8 Attack analysis
We have verified our implementation with the TI packet
sniffer [39] during various attacks. We show three phases
for each attack experiment: No attack, Attack, and BCNSec Enabled During Attack.
The throughput given in Figs. 16, 17, and 19 are based
on the total number of data in bits per second. The data is
counted only during the CFP and does not include the SH
and the MIC (when BCN-Sec is enabled). As a result, the
data throughput when BCN-Sec is enabled is lower than
‘‘No Security.’’ For each of the six attacks, we measured
the packet transmission for 70–230 s depending on the
complexity of each attack.
8.1 Synchronization attack
In this attack, the MN impersonates the PC and broadcasts
manipulated beacons (i.e., for a shorter SF) to LN2. Then,

Wireless Netw (2015) 21:1517–1535

(a) Data throughput changes by synchronization attack and BCN−Sec
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Fig. 16 LN2 data throughput
changes after synchronizing
with beacons from MN and after
BCN-Sec enabled. The intervals
are between the first beacon and
the first data packet in SFs
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Fig. 17 LN2 and LN6 data
throughput during CFP blocked
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(b) (a)’s improvement in attack using MAC layer and BCN−Sec
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LN2 synchronizes with the manipulated beacons as shown
in the Attack phase. Figure 16(a) shows LN2’s data
throughput and (b) the intervals between the beacon and
the first data packet in the SF in three phases of the
experiments.
Figure 16(a) illustrates that while the data throughput of
LN2 is increasing up to 50 bps with the interval at about
265 ms, the MN starts broadcasting malicious beacons with
BO (4) and SO (2) around the 15-s mark whereas the PC
broadcasts beacons with BO (6) and SO (4). At this
moment, LN2 synchronizes the SFs with the MN’s beacons
and transmits data to the MN with the interval of about 56
ms [which corresponds to BO (4) and SO (2)]. As a result,

LN2’s data throughput (to the legitimate PC) starts
decreasing. Figure 16(b) shows the patterns of the interval
changes (265 ms (the No Attack phase) ! 56 ms (the
Attack phase ! 2774 ms (the BCN-Sec Enabled During
Attack phase)) while the synchronization attack is executing and BCN-Sec is enabled.
Once BCN-Sec is enabled around the 45-s mark in both
Fig. 16(a) and (b), LN2’s data throughput increases to 50

4

The difference of the interval during BCN-Sec enabled compared to
265 ms of the No Attack phase is 12 ms because of the processing
overhead added by BCN-Sec
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bps. In addition, the interval increases to 277 ms accordingly, which is a proper interval for BCN-Sec.
8.2 DoS of data transmission
As mentioned in Sect. 6.1, the attacks can be implemented
at the Application or MAC layers. In this section, we
illustrate why we chose to implement to implement the
attacks at the MAC layer.
Impersonating LNs at the Application Layer: In this
attack, the MN impersonates LN2 and LN6 and sends GTS
deallocation requests to block LN2 and LN6’s data transmission during the CFP. Figure 17(a) shows the decline of
data throughput on LN2 and LN6 while the MN is sending
GTS deallocation requests using LN2 and LN6’s IDs.
Around the 25-s mark and 30-s mark, the MN sends
GTS deallocation requests against LN2 and LN6’s GTS
descriptors in the beacon. This makes the PC drop GTS
descriptors for LN2 and LN6. Therefore, the data
throughput from LN2 and LN6 during the CFP drops to
0 bps. Even though LN2 and LN6 try to send GTS allocation requests, the requests cannot be processed due to the
MN continuously sending GTS deallocation requests.
However, the data throughput from LN2 and LN6 increase
after BCN-Sec is enabled around the 40-s mark, even while
the MN continues to send GTS deallocation requests.
Impersonating LNs at the MAC Layer: By modifying the
MAC layer (as discussed in Sect. 6.1), the MN can send
faster GTS deallocation requests; fast enough to be sent
immediately following beacons and LN2 and LN6’s GTS
allocation requests. This leads to the same result of
blocking data transmission, but allows the Attack phase to
begin much sooner. Thus, Fig. 17(b) shows that the data
throughput from LN2 and LN6 drops around the 20-s mark,
which is earlier than when it occurred in Fig. 17(a) (around
the 27-s mark).
In Fig. 17(b), in addition to the MN’s first GTS deallocation requests around the 20-s mark as shown in Fig. 17(a),
the MN also blocks LN2 and LN6’s GTS allocation requests
around the 50-s mark, which shows that the MN efficiently
sends GTS deallocation requests only when LN2 and LN6
send GTS allocation requests. After BCN-Sec is enabled
around the 70-s mark, the MN is still sending GTS deallocation request, and the PC is ignoring these request because
BCN-Sec is enabled. However, the throughput from LN2 and
LN6 only begins to increase after the 80-s mark. This is
because the quick deallocation in response to the constant
GTS allocation request caused collisions and an inadvertent
brief DoS attack (which is not the focus of BCN-Sec).
Impersonating the PC: In this attack, the MN impersonates the PC and broadcasts manipulated beacons with no
GTS descriptors. Figure 17(c) shows that the MN starts
sending the same beacons without GTS descriptors (i.e., no
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GTS descriptors in the beacons) around the 25-s mark, which
immediately cripples LN2 and LN6’s data throughput. LN2
and LN6 process only the manipulated beacons from the MN
after around the 25-s mark and assume that no GTS is
available due to the manipulated beacons.
By impersonating the PC, we produce the same blocking
of data transmission as that shown in Fig. 17(a), (b), and
(c). However, after BCN-Sec is enabled at around the 40-s
mark, LN2 and LN6 begin to synchronize with the PC, not
with the MN. Then, their data throughput increases since
the PC allocates the GTSs for LN2 and LN6 properly.
8.3 False data injection
In this attack, the MN impersonates LN2 to send false data
in GTSs. Figure 18 shows the changes of humidity and
temperature values from LN2. We tested this attack inside
a building, where the humidity and temperature conditions
were approximately 48 % and 83 F respectively.
However, since the MN sends false data readings of
90 % for the humidity and 28 F for the temperature during
the CFP, this results in fluctuations of the sensed data
reported for 10 s around the 23–31-s mark. Since 28 F is
below the freezing point, the false temperature data might
lead to a warning sign in a critical situation.
After BCN-Sec is enabled, the false data readings are
ignored from the PC because data from the MN are not
authenticated.
8.4 DoS of GTS requests
In this attack, the MN sends GTS allocation requests with 7
different IDs to take all 7 GTSs. Figure 19(a) shows the
normal data throughput patterns with the first two GTS
allocation requests from LN2 until the 80-s mark. the MN
starts occupying GTSs from the 80-s mark by sending GTS
allocation requests and takes 6 GTSs; all GTSs except the
one GTS already assigned to LN2. LN2 continues to send
data using its one assigned GTS until around the 110-s mark.
Around the 115-s, LN2 sends a GTS deallocation
request and the MN sends one GTS allocation request
immediately and quickly occupies the remaining one GTS.
This causes the halt of data transmission from the 120-s
mark to the 150-s mark.
After BCN-Sec is (enabled and all GTSs are deallocated), LN2’s data throughput returns to normal with the GTS
allocation requests while the MN continuously sends GTS
allocation requests.
8.5 Stealing network bandwidth
In this attack, the MN takes all 7 GTSs and transmits data
to make the bandwidth unavailable to LN2. Figure
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19(b) shows the data throughput from LN2 and the MN
with the GTS allocation requests from both. While LN2 has
one GTS and transmits data during the CFP, the MN starts
sending GTS allocation requests with 7 forged IDs around
the 10-s mark and transmits data at the assigned GTSs. One
of 7 GTS allocation requests of the MN is discarded at the
first attempt because one GTS is already assigned to LN2.
However, as soon as LN2 releases its GTS around the
40-s mark, the MN immediately occupies the last GTS (and
has all 7 GTSs). This is why only the MN is able to
transmit data from the 40-s mark to the 55-s mark.
Although LN2 sends one GTS allocation request around
the 45-s mark, it is ignored by the PC because all 7 slots
have been allocated to the MN.
After BCN-Sec is (enabled and all GTSs are deallocated) around the 70-s mark, even though the MN tries to get
GTSs by generating multiple GTS allocation requests, they
are ignored and there is only LN2’s data throughput from
the 75-s mark.

9 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we first described the existing vulnerabilities of
the beacon broadcast and the GTS management scheme in
the 802.15.4 standard. We also investigated security protocols proposed in recent years and security mechanisms
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adopted in the standard. However, to date, no method comprehensively addresses the weakness of the beacon-enabled
802.15.4 MAC. To demonstrate the vulnerabilities in the
802.15.4 MAC, we implemented six attacks: (1) Synchronization attack, (2) DoS of data transmission by impersonating LNs, (3) DoS of data transmission by impersonating the
PC, (4) False data injection, (5) DoS of GTS requests, and (6)
Stealing network bandwidth. We also presented and implemented a countermeasure, BCN-Sec, and demonstrated how
it defended against the attacks. We analyzed the results for
each attack and their defense with BCN-Sec. Future work
will provide a dynamic-key disclosure for newly generated
key chains and a detailed energy measurement of our attacks
and BCN-Sec.
Acknowledgments This work was partly supported by NSF Grant
No. CAREER-CNS-844144.
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